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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines from an international perspective the growth experience of a 
group "non-oil" economies in the Middle East and North Africa region—Syria, 
Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco—over the period 1966-85. The empirical 
framework we use focuses on four central variables: per-capita income, investment, 
school enrollment and population growth. We estimate the relationship those variables 
have with each other as well as with other variables in a cross-section of nearly ninety 
countries, and ask whether our group of countries conform to this international pattern.. 
The main regional features we uncover are: (1) Exceptionally high fertility rates 
compared to other countries at a similar stage of development, but that may not have 
imposed a heavy drag on economic growth; (2) A bias in national saving away from 
physical capital accumulation and, in the Mashreq, toward human capital accumulation; 
(3) A very low initial income level in 1966, compared to the "balanced-growth" level 
predicted from international experience; and (4) A substantially higher final level of 
income in 1985 compared to countries with similar saving behavior and a similar 
starting point. Apparently, with the likely help of the regional oil boom of the 1970s, 
our group of countries wasable to close the negative income gap they started with 













This paper examines from an international perspective the growth experience of a 
group of "non-oil" economies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region— 
Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco—over the years The empirical 
framework we use focuses on four central variables: per-capita income, investment, 
school enrollment and population growth. We estimate the relationship those variables 
have with each other as well as with other variables in a cross-section of nearly ninety 
countries, and ask whether MENA economies conform to this international pattern. 
Our goal is to use an international comparative framework to characterize the historic 
growth process in the region, and formulate a number of hypotheses than can form the 
basis for future research. 
To analyze the determinants of per-capita income, we follow work by Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992, henceforth MRW), who show in a cross-section of countries 
that a country's income is well predicted by the investmentlGDP ratio, secondary 
school enrollment, population growth, and initial income. By introducing dummies for 
the region, we ask whether MENA countries fall within the pattern uncovered from the 
data. MRW also provide us with a useful structural interpretation of their empirical 
findings in terms of the traditional Solow (1956) growth model extended to encompass 
human as well as physical capital. 
Our MENA group of countries turns out to exhibit patterns that are rather 
homogenous. The characteristic that, perhaps, stands out most is the group's 
exceptionally high fertility rates compared to other countries at a similar stage of 
development. The second characteristic we uncover is a bias in national saving away 
from physical capital accumulation and, in the Mashreq, toward human capital 
accumulation. Our countries have had generally lower investment and, in the Mashreq 
countries, higher secondary school enrollment compared to other countries with similar 
characteristics. This is consistent with a pattern, documented by Moore (1980) in the 
case of Egypt, of educating and training workers without sufficiently investing in the 
productive capacity needed to employ their skills. 
What was the performance of our regional economies in terms of income? We 
answer this question in two stages. First, we examine the determination of per-capita 
income in 1985 given investment, enrollment rates, population growth and initial 
income. There we find that, perhaps surprisingly, our group of countries had 
substantially higher levels of income than the experience of other countries would 
predict. 
In search for an explanation, we look in a second stage at those countries' net 
performance, after accounting for the effects on income of their unusual saving and 
demographic behavior and of their starting point. It appears from our regressions that 
the effects of unusually high population growth, low investment and high enrollment 
rates were limited. In particular, there is little evidence from our cross-country analysis 
to show that high population growth rates have imposed a very heavy drag on 
economic growth. This result is particularly intriguing for the region, and merits 
further exploration. Apparently, the strongest effect comes from the group's initial 
income level in 1966, which was substantially lower than the "balanced-growth" level 
predicted from international experience. Once we net out the effect of their very low 
starting point, per-capita income in our group of countries looks close to the level 
predicted from international evidence. In the final analysis, what is apparently unusual 
about the income performance of countries in the region is, with the likely help of the 
regional oil boom of the 1970s, how fast they were able to close the negative income 
gap they started with in the mid-1960s. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part II presents MRW's extended 
Solow model and sets up the basic framework we use for empirical analysis. Part III 
presents and interprets regression results for fertility, enrollments, investment and 
income, together with regional and country-specific dummies. Part IV concludes. 
II. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
We start by presenting a simple model of growth that will constitute the main 
benchmark we use to interpret our empirical results. Next, we develop an empirical 
framework that naturally flows from this model and will be used in the rest of this 
paper. 
1. An Extended Solow Model 
The model of economic growth we present is the traditional Solow (1956) model 
extended by MRW to encompass investment in human capital as well as physical 
capital. MRW assume an aggregate production function 
= (1) 
where 1', is output, K, and [-I, are physical and human capital, L, is raw labor input, and 
A, is the exogenously determined level of aggregate productivity, all at time t. Output 
per worker is denoted by y, Y,IL,. 
Physical and human capital accumulation follow the laws of motion 
(2) 
(3) 
where I, and Z, denote investment in physical and human capital, respectively, and 8 is 
their rate of depreciation. Given the saving rates sk and Sh for physical and human 




Finally, we denote the growth rates of the labor input and of aggregate productivity by 
n > 0 and g > 0, respectively. 
As long as the aggregate production function exhibits diminishing returns with 
respect to physical and human capital, i.e. a+fi < 1, the economy's levels of output 
and capital stock converge to a history-independent balanced growth path.4 From 
equations (l)-(5), it can be shown that the logarithm of per-capita output along the 
balanced-growth path (denoted by yt*) is given by 
ln(y) = mA0 +gt (6) 
An economy's balanced-growth level of income is a function of its physical and human 
capital saving rates sk and sh, and of its population growth rate n. Countries with 
different parameters Sk, sh and n will converge to different balanced-growth levels of 
per-capita income. However, as long as they share the same technology, they will be 
growing in the long run at the same exogenous rate g along their balanced-growth 
path.5 
On their way to the balanced-growth equilibrium, economies may grow at 
different rates that reflect their convergence process. Linearizing around the balanced- 





Integrating (7) over t years, we can express per-capita income Yt as a function of the 
initial level Yo and the balanced-growth level y1*: 
ln(y1) = In(y0). (9) 
Using equation (6), we get an expression for per-capita income off the balanced-growth 
path, as a function of Yo and the balanced-growth level as predicted by the structural 
parameters Sk, Sh and n: 
ln(y1) (1— + ln(y0). 
(10) 
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2. Patterns of Development in the Ertended Solow Model: Specification and Data 
The extended Solow model relates a country's economic development to its saving 
behavior and population growth. In turn, saving and population growth may depend on 
the level of development already achieved. This leads to a natural empirical framework 
for analyzing the patterns of development across countries, consisting of four equations 
in the four central variables: per-capita income, physical capital investment, human 
capital investment, and population growth. Our object is to use this framework to see 
how the pattern of development in MENA countries over the period 1966-85 compares 
to the experience of economies outside the region. 
Per-Capita Income 
The first equation in our framework concerns the determination of per-capita 
income. It is based on equation (10), which expresses the log of per-capita income 
as a function of 
(i) the log of the physical capital saving rate ln(sk); 
(ii) the log of the human capital saving rate ln(sh); 
(iii) the population growth rate n; 
(iv) the log of initial income ln(y3). 
MRW assume the parameters a, 8 and g are common across countries, and turn 
equation (10) into an empirical model which they estimate using OLS.6 MRW are very 
much aware of the biases that may arise in such a regression. If shocks to a country's 
aggregate production function are highly persistent, for example, they will affect both 
initial income and the error term, leading to upward bias in the coefficient on ln(y0). 
Perhaps MRW's best defense are the reasonable values they obtain for the model's 
parameters.7 
In our comparative study of the MENA region, we could either follow MRW in 
the assumption that biases are not strong, or, following Barro (1991), take an a- 
structural approach to our growth regressions. In the latter case, we could still ask 
whether MENA countries had income levels consistent with the pattern exhibited by 
other countries, given their saving and population growth rates. However, we would 
loose any structural interpretation for our results. The approach we choose to take is an 
eclectic one. We develop our basic interpretation under the hypothesis that biases are 
not too strong, but draw our conclusions with a careful eye on their sensitivity to 
estimation bias. 
What empirical counterparts do we use for ln(,y), sk, Sh and n? From an 
international comparative perspective, there are serious problems with comparing 
incomes across countries when different relative prices—between tradables and non- 
tradables, e.g.—are used in their respective national accounts. For this reason, we use 
the Real National Accounts international data constructed by Summers and Heston 
(1991) based on a common price structure ("international prices") across all countries. 
We measure In(y) as the log of real GDP per capita in 1985 international prices. Since 
our period of study is 1966-85, the empirical measures of and ln(,y0) will be 
denoted by LGDP85 and LGDP66. 
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For the physical capital saving rate log the Summers-Heston 
investment/GDP ratio (LINVR) averaged over the period of study. Mostly with an 
opportunity cost of schooling in mind, we measure the human capital saving rate ln(sh) 
using the log of the secondary school enrollment rate (LENR2) averaged over the 
period of study. Finally, we use the average annual population growth rate over the 
period of study (POPO) to measure n. 
With the exception of population growth, the determinants of output that equation 
(10) leads us to examine have proven robustly related to economic growth in past 
econometric work. Levine and Renelt (1992) show that the empirical linkage with per- 
capita GDP growth is quite robust for the investment ratio, secondary school 
enrollment and initial per-capita GDP. The linkage is more fragile for the population 
growth rate, and depends on what other regressors are used. 
Physical Capital Investment 
The second equation in our framework expresses the log investment ratio LINVR 
as a function of 
(i) the log secondary school enrollment rate (LENR2); 
(ii) the price level of investment goods (P1); 
(iii) the economy's degree of openness (OPEN), as measured by the sum of 
exports and imports over GDP. 
All three determinants of investment have a theoretical justification. Higher 
education levels may encourage investment, if the productivity of physical capital rises 
with the education level of the associated work-force. A higher price of investment 
goods may reduce the demand for investment and exhibit a negative correlation with it, 
as several empirical studies have shown (Barro 1991, De Long and Summers 1991). 
Finally, the economy's degree of openness has been shown to be robustly positively 
related to investment (Levine and Renelt 1992). One explanation is that a more open 
economy can count on a greater variety of intermediate products, that raise the return 
on investment. Openess can also be a measure of economic liberalization or of the 
international mobility of capital. 
Human Capital In vestment 
Our third equation relates the log secondary school enrollment rate to 
(i) the relative cost of secondary school teachers (CTEA2); 
(ii) the proportion of households that is urban (URBAN); 
(iii) the initial level of log per-capita income (LGDP66). 
A detailed study of the cross-country determinants of enrollment rates can be 
found in Schultz (1985). We take our three variables from his study. The "relative cost 
of teachers" is meant to measure the cost of hiring a teacher relative to the cost of an 
average worker in the economy. It is calculated as current public expenditures on 
secondary schools per teacher divided by GDP per worker. As a measure of the 
scarcity of teachers, it should be negatively correlated with enrollment. The higher rate 
of urbanization may be associated with higher enrollments, either because it increases 
the demand for education or because it makes it cheaper to provide. Finally, higher 
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income levels can pay for more education, considered either as an investment or a 
consumption good. 
Population Growth 
We model either population growth (POPG) or fertility (FERTIL) as a function of 
(i) the log secondary school enrollment rate (LENR2); 
(ii) the initial level of log per-capita income (LGDP66); 
(iii) the mortality rate of children below age five (MORT5); 
Those variables are chosen to reflect important elements in the households' fertility 
choices. From this perspective, fertility is our preferred variable for this specification. 
Barro (1991) shows that fertility is negatively correlated with school enrollment and 
income. The negative association with school enrollment could be due to sociological 
factors that make more educated couples have fewer children. It could also be due to a 
tradeoff between the "quantity" and "quality" of children (see, e.g., Becker, Murphy 
and Tamura 1990 and Barro and Becker 1991). This last hypothesis could also explain 
the negative relation between fertility and income. Finally, Barro (1991) finds a 
positive effect of child mortality rates on gross fertility rates. His results seem to 
indicate that couples make their choices mostly in terms of net rather than gross 
fertility. 
Initial income 
Since initial income in 1966 is used as an explanatory variable for 1985 income in 
equation (10), we shall also be interested in analyzing it. In particular, based oct the 
experience of other countries, we will ask how far initial income in the region was 
from the balanced-growth level yo* predicted by equation (6). In order to do that, we 
regress LGDP66 upon the following variables: 
(i) the log average investment ratio over the period 1960-1966 (LINVR6O66); 
(ii) the log average school enrollment rate over the period 1960-66 
(LENR2 6066); 
Finding that, for example, y in the region was significantly below the predicted y* in 
1966 could mean that the region was really below its true or that the true y* was 
below its predicted level. 
Summary 
Our empirical framework models the dependence of four "explained" variables on 
each other and other "non-explained" variables. It also analyzes the dependence of 
initial per-capita income upon lagged saving rates. Table 1 summarizes the different 
types of variables under study. The data appendix gives more detailed information on 
data definition and sources. 
[Table 1] 
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III. PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: 
1966-1985 
1. Empirical Strategy and Data Coverage 
Our strategy is to estimate the model outlined above for a broad cross-section of 
countries, and control for MENA economies through dummy variables. This will help 
us investigate the development patterns that are spec jfic to the region, taking as a 
benchmark the experience of our international cross-section of countries. 
The period of study we selected is 1966 to The cross-section of countries 
we chose to compare the MENA group to is the broadest available set of countries that 
are not "small," not "oil economies" and not "planned economies."9 The resulting 
cross-section has 94 countries. 
2. A First Look at the Data 
Before presenting our regression results, we take a first look at the data for the 
region. Table 2 compares MENA figures to the US and to averages for a group of 28 
"middle-income" economies from our sample, defined as countries outside the region 
with 1985 per-capita income between 10% and 30% of the equivalent US figure)° This 
corresponds roughly to the range of 1985 per-capita income in MENA countries 
(ranging from 12% of US income in Egypt to 30% in Syria) and yields an average 
1985 income level for the middle-income group very close to the MENA average (both 
at roughly 18% of the US figure). 
[Table 
A crude look at the data in table 2 tells a story that generally anticipates our 
regression results. The demographic data at the top of the table reveal the significantly 
higher fertility rates in every MENA country (averaging 6.5 children per woman) 
compared to the middle-income average (4.7 children per woman). This is reflected in 
a higher average population growth rate. 
Human capital data show below average primary enrollment and average 
secondary enrollment rates for the region, compared to the middle-income group. The 
latter hides important regional variations, with significantly above-average figures for 
the three Mashreq countries and below average figures in the Maghreb. Adult literacy 
is significantly below average, suggesting that MENA countries suffer from an 
important handicap in terms of their initial stock of human capital. Turning to figures 
on the investment/GDP ratio, we find that the region is significantly below average, 
with an average investment/GDP ratio of 13.6% compared to 19.0% for other middle- 
income economies. 
Finally, the table shows data on real per-capita income in 1966 and 1985 as a 
fraction of the equivalent figure in 1985. Two measures of income are presented for 
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1985: the Summers-Heston measure based on the 1985 international price system 
common to all countries, and the more traditional World Bank figure that uses each 
country's different relative price structure and compares incomes at official exchange 
rates. For the average middle-income economy, moving from the World Bank to the 
Summers-Heston measure multiplies per-capita income relative to the US by a factor of 
2.5. This is mostly due to the fact that non-tradables are cheaper relative to tradables in 
those countries than they are in the US. If we think of tradables as being, by their very 
nature, roughly priced equally across countries using official exchange rates 
(Purchasing Power Parity), the World Bank measure will attribute a smaller weight to 
non-tradables in our middle-income economies than in the US. 
In principle, the difference between the two measures should be greater the more 
closed the economy is (which should raise the price of tradables vs. non-tradables). 
This is confirmed in the case of Syria and Jordan, the most closed and the most open 
economies in the MENA group (their openness measures are 17% and 52%, 
respectively). Moving from the World Bank to the Summers-Heston measures, income 
relative to the US rises by a factor of 2.9 in Syria and by a factor of 1.5 in Jordan, 
taking Syrian income far ahead of Jordan in terms of international prices. 
Table 2 also calculates the annual real growth rate of per-capita income between 
1966 and 1985. It is clear that the average growth rate in the region has been 
significantly higher than the growth rate of the average middle-income economy, a fact 
that we will be discussing extensively in what follows. 
3. Fertility 
We present our empirical results in an order opposite to our model description in 
part II, building up from the determinants of output to the output equation. Table 3 
presents our regression results for the fertility / population growth equation. 
[Table 3] 
OLS regression (11) uses fertility as a dependent variable and yields a high R2 of 
0.78, with all variables significant and of the expected sign. The MENA dummy is 
significant and indicates that the "average" woman in this group of countries had 1.68 
more children than international patterns would predict. Turning to regression (12) with 
individual country dummies, we see that, with the notable exception of Egypt, the 
high-fertility pattern is homogenous and highly significant across the different countries 
in the MENA Egypt alone seems to have a "normal" fertility level. 
Regressions (l3)-(14) use population growth rather than fertility as a dependent 
variable. They are much less successful, with a lower R2 and only initial income a 
significant variable. This is perhaps not surprising,' given that we have included 
variables intended to explain mostly households' fertility choices and have not included 
other demographic variables that relate population growth to fertility. Nevertheless, the 
message that comes out of equations (l3)-(14) is the same as above, although less 
forceful. Annual population growth rates in the MENA group were about 0.56 
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percentage points higher than predicted. Again with the exception of Egypt, the pattern 
seems homogenous across the different countries in the group. 
4. School Enrollment 
We now turn to our secondary-school enrollment equation. Because we are 
missing the cost of teachers (CTEA2) for Jordan, we present our results with and 
without that variable. Regressions (15)-(16) in table 4 present results excluding the cost 
of teachers. Both URBAN and LGDP66 are significant and yield a high R2 of 0.7. The 
coefficient on MENA in (15) indicates that, conditionally on URBAN and LGDP66, 
MENA countries appear to have had 44% more children enrolled in secondary schools 
than other countries. Looking at the individual-country coefficients in (16), we find 
that this pattern is limited to the Mashreq countries in our group, while the two 
Maghreb countries have more "normal" enrollment rates. Although high enrollment 
rates are an encouraging sign, it is quite possible that they have come at the expense of 
a low quality of education. 
[Table 4] 
If we turn to regression (17), which includes the cost of teachers, we find that, as 
expected, the coefficient on this last variable is significantly negative. Beyond this, 
none of the qualitative conclusions above are modified. 
Our focus on enrollment in secondary rather than primary schools is motivated by 
the fact that, empirically, the former is more robustly correlated with economic growth 
than the latter. This does not mean that primary enrollment rates are less important, but 
probably that they are noisier measures that hide greater variations in the true quality of 
education received)2 In fact, students of the returns to education have argued that 
returns are higher for primary than for secondary education (Psacharopoulos 1985). 
Regression (18) looks at the determinants of log primary school enrollment rates 
(LENR1). None of the explanatory variables is very significant, which is consistent 
with our view of primary enrollment rates as a relatively noisy measure of human 
capital accumulation and indicates that conclusions based on those figures should be 
used with great caution. The pattern for MENA countries is very mixed. It is 
interesting to note that, comparatively speaking, Egypt seems to have a strong bias 
toward secondary education while Tunisia has the opposite bias toward primary 
education. 
Enrollment rates represent a form of accumulation of human capital, but may not 
represent a good measure of the stock of human capital accumulated over time. 
Regression (19) looks at the literacy rate in 1985 (L1T85) as one measure of the latter, 
and simply regresses it over per-capita income in 1985 and the MENA country 
dummies. With the exception of Jordan, whose literacy rate was significantly above its 
predicted level, all the other MENA countries show as significant negative discrepancy 
with other countries ranging from 11% to Thus MENA countries have 
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apparently had an average to above average pace of human capital accumulation, but 
had to make up for a very low starting point. 
5. Investment 
Regression equation (20) in table 5 looks at the determinants of the investment 
ratio. All variables are significant and of the expected sign, and yield an R2 of 0.70. 
The MENA coefficient is significant and indicates that MENA countries have invested 
17% less than would be predicted from the experience of other countries, when 
controlling for the regressors. Equation (21) shows that, with the exception of Tunisia 
which has a healthy above-average record, the low-investment pattern is strikingly 
homogenous across the other countries. 
[Table 5] 
Explanations for low investment in the region abound: the economic distortions 
that resulted from the planned development policies adopted in the 1950s and 60s; the 
political instabilities and frequent nationalizations that occurred over the same period; 
the very large share of military spending in GDP (which amounted to about 13% for 
the region in the mid-eighties). 
6. Per-Capita Income 
Basic Output Equation 
We now turn to the basic output equation and present our regression results in 
table 6. Coefficients are significant on all explanatory variables but population growth, 
and yield a very high R2 of 0.92. The coefficient on population growth is negative but 
not very significant, confirming Levine and Renelt's (1992) finding that the negative 
empirical relation between population and economic growth is not robust. The evidence 
on this last question is surveyed by Kelley and Schmidt (1992). While older studies 
(such as Kuzriets 1967) seemed to find no correlation between population and income 
growth, studies based on more recent data tend to find a negative but fragile 
correlation. If this..result is to be trusted, there are no strong grounds for being overly 
pessimistic about the growth performance of MENA countries because of their high 
fertility rates. 
[Table 6] 
The coefficient on initial income in regressions (22)-(23) is significantly smaller 
than 1, indicating that, as the modified Solow model predicts, countries "converge" in 
per-capita income terms conditional on their saving rates. However, the implied rate of 
convergence 0.01 [7) is slow and leads to highly persistent initial conditions. It 
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requires 59 years for a country to close half the gap between its starting income level 
and its balanced-growth level. 
The MENA coefficient in regression (22) is highly significant, and indicates that, 
between 1966 and 1985, MENA countries have reached income levels that are 34% 
higher than their saving characteristics and starting point would predict. Regression 
(23) shows that this pattern of strong conditional performance in incomes is common to 
all countries in the region except Jordan. Going back to equation (10), the positive 
MENA coefficient could either mean that they converged to their balanced-growth path 
faster than expected, or that their balanced-growth income level is higher than one 
would predict. In order to examine those two hypotheses, we now turn to an analysis of 
the determinants of initial income in 1966. 
Initial Income 
Table 7 presents regressions of log initial income in 1966 on the log average 
investment ratio and enrollment rates over the period 1960-66. As mentioned 
previously, we interpret this equation as an estimate of the balanced-growth income 
level in equation (6). All coefficients in regression (24) are significant and yield an R2 
of 0.71. The MENA coefficient is significantly negative, and indicates that 1966 
incomes in MENA countries were on average 39% below their predicted balanced- 
growth levels. Regression (25) shows that this pattern is significant for all countries in 
the MENA group except Morocco. Thus MENA countries in 1966 were either at an 
early stage of convergence to their balanced growth path, 'or were highly unproductive. 
[Table 
7. Summaiy Accounts 
Our results for the output equation suggest that, over the 1966-85 period, output 
performance in MENA countries has been strong, conditionally on investment, 
enrollment, population growth and initial income. But has MENA output performance 
been strong in absolute terms? In other words, once we account for their discrepancies 
in investment, enrollments, population growth and initial income, would we still 
conclude that MENA countries have performed particularly well? 
To answer this question, we summarized in table 8 the discrepancies we found in 
the MENA group for each of our four main variables as well as initial income. Using 
the coefficients for the determinants of income estimated in (22), we calculated the 
effect of those discrepancies on income. Adding the effects on income of the different 
discrepancies, we arrive at a "net discrepancy" for the region.'4 
[Table 8] 
The estimated effect on income growth over the period 1966-85 of the regional 
discrepancy in population growth is estimated at a mere -2.8%. The small magnitude of 
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this effect comes from the insignificant coefficient for population growth in the income 
equation. As we have seen, the fact that the evidence is weak for a heavy population 
drag on economic growth is good news for MENA countries, with their exceptionally 
high fertility rates. 
[Table 8] 
The estimated effects of discrepancies in enrollment rates and investment are 
+ 11.6% and -4.3%, respectively. It is important to keep in mind that the income 
equation coefficients we use for enrollment rates and investment measure the effect of 
those variables over a 19 year period, given initial income. As equation (10) makes 
clear, their effect would be stronger over a longer period. Nevertheless, those 
estimated effects are limited, especially when compared to the effect of initial income. 
The effect of the negative discrepancy in initial income on final income is by far 
the strongest, equal to -33.7%. This effect reflects the slow conditional convergence 
process of incomes uncovered from the data, which leads disturbances in initial income 
to be highly persistent. The coefficient on initial income in equation (22) predicts that 
80% of the discrepancies to 1966 income would have persisted until 1985. The effect 
of the regional short-fall in 1966 incomes is so strong that it eats up almost all of the 
34.3% positive discrepancy in the final income equation. The net income performance 
of MENA countries, once we account for the discrepancies in the different equations, 
appears quite average, with a net discrepancy of only 4.4%. 
A plausible hypothesis that links the discrepancies in the initial income and final 
income equations is as follows. MENA countries started with a significant negative 
income gap in 1966, either because they were far below their balanced-growth income 
level or because, historically, their aggregate production function had suffered an 
adverse shock. However, with the likely help of the regional oil-boom of the 1970s, 
our group of countries were able to grow (conditionally) faster than other countries and 
make up for most of their initial negative income gap. 
One way to test this "fast catch up" hypothesis is to check whether countries 
within our group that had greater gaps in initial income ended up catching up faster and 
having a greater discrepancy in final income. To do so, we collected the residuals 
RESIDO from the initial income equation (excluding the dummies), and included the 
product MENAxRESIDO together with the MENA dummy in the final income 
equation. The result, presented in table 9, is a significant negative coefficient on the 
MENAxRESIDO product that supports our hypothesis. 
[Table 91 
IV. SUMMARY 
Our international comparison of economic growth in the MENA group of 
countries—Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco—over the period 1966-85 has 
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uncovered a significant degree of homogeneity. The main distinguishing features of the 
pattern of growth in MENA countries are: 
(1) Exceptionally high fertility rates; 
(2) Low physical investment rates coupled, for the Mashreq countries, with high 
school enrollment rates; 
(3) A significant negative gap in initial income; 
(4) High growth rates over the period of study that made up for the initial income 
gap. 
The relatively good income performance during the period is not something that is 
likely to persist. It seems to be a phenomenon of "fast catch up" with the benefit of a 
booming regional environment. Both the initial income gap and the booming 
environment had disappeared by 1985. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
This appendix gives the definition and sources of the data used in the paper. 
LGDP85 Log per-capita GDP, 1985 (using 1985 international prices; Chain 
index). Source: Summers-Hestori (1991). 
LGDP66 Log per-capita GDP, 1966 (using 1985 international prices; Chain 
index). Source: Sum mers-Heston (1991). 
LINVR Log average real investment / GDP ratio (private and public), 1966-85 
(using 1985 international prices). Source: Sum mers-Heston (1991). 
LINVR6O66 Log average real investment I GDP ratio (private and public), 1960-66 
(using 1985 international prices). Source: Summers-Heston (1991). 
LENR2 Log average secondary school enrollment rate, 1966-85. Source: World 
Bank. 
LENR26066 Log average secondary school enrollment rate, 1960-66. Source: World 
Bank. 
POPG Annual population growth rate (%), 1966-85. Source: Summers-Heston 
(1991). 
FERTIL Average fertility rate, 1966-85. Source: World Bank. 
P1 Price level of investment, 1975. Source: Summers-Heston (1991). 
OPEN Openness (exports + imports)/GDP (current international prices). 
Source: Summers-Heston (1991). 
URBAN Average proportion of households that is urban, 1966-85. Source: World 
Bank. 
CTEA2 Relative cost of secondary school teachers, 1966. It is calculated as 
Current public expenditure on secondary schools per teacher / GDP per 
worker. Sources: UNESCO Yearbooks and World Bank. 
MORT5 Average below-five child mortality rate, 1966-85. Source: World Bank. 
EGY Dummy variable for Egypt. 
JOR Dummy variable for Jordan. 
MAR Dummy variable for Morocco. 
SYR Dummy variable for Syria. 
TUN Dummy variable for Tunisia. 
MENA Dummy variable for the MENA group of countries (Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Syria and Tunisia). 
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ENDNOTES 
tPaper written for the Cairo Conference of the Initiative to Encourage Economic Research on the Middle 
East and North Africa, June 1993. This paper was written while Mohamad 1-laminour was visiting at 
DELTA. We thank Hélène Bouaziz and Dorte Werner for their excellent research assistance, and Jess 
Benhabib, Hanaa Khair-el-Din, Hashem Pesaran, Antoine Zahian and participants at the Cairo conference 
for helpful comments. All errors are our sole responsibility. 
2For three general references on economic growth in the MENA region, see Richards and Waterbury 
(1990), Sa'diddin et al. (1989) and Barlow (1982). At several points in their book (see pp. 85, 108, 115, 
e.g.), Richards and Waterbury adopt an international comparative approach to the region in the spirit 
what we propose to do more systematically here. 
3By relating investment to domestic saving rates, we are implicitly assuming imperfect capital mobility. 
This correlation between investment and domestic saving was documented empirically by Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980). 
41f a+fi = 1, the economy exhibits "endogenous growth," in the sense that per-capita output may 
exhibit sustained growth even in the absence of growth in exogenous productivity A1 (see, e.g., Romer 
1990 and Lucas 1988). In this case, the economy's balanced growth path becomes history-dependent: 
countries that are otherwise similar may not converge to the same level of per.-capita income, if they did 
not start at the same level. 
5Again, this would not hold if a+fi = 1. In that case, higher saving countries would be growing faster 
along their balanced growth path. 
6Stnctly speaking, equation (10) is non-linear in n because it enters through the term ln(n + g + 6) and 
because 2 is itself a function of n (see equation 8). Our estimated equation can be thought of as a 
linearization of (10). 
7This is true for their estimates of both equations (9) and (10). As far as equation (10) is concerned, the 
implied parameter. restrictions are not rejected. MRWs "restricted" regression estimated with their 
"intermediate" sample implies values for a, ,Band 2 equal to 0.44, 0.23 and 0.0 142, respectively. 
8For most countries, Summers-Heston data start in 1960. We reserved the period 1960-66 to get lagged 
investment data for the study of initial income. 
9We define a 'small' economy as one that had a population less than 1 million in 1985. The other 
restrictions rule out the following countries: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Congo, Gahon, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Liberia and Saudi Arabia ("oil economies"); China, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia ("planned 
economies"). Finally, we excluded Afghanistan because of the Soviet invasion, and Lesotho because "the 
sum of private and government consumption far exceed GDP in every year of the sample, indicating that 
labor income from abroad constitutes an extremely large fraction of GNP" (MRW, fn. 5, p. 413). 
countries that make up the "middle-income" group are Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the 
Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay. 
t1Richards and Waterbury (1990, p. 85) obtain a similar result. 
15 
12For example, the compulsory nature of primary education in many countries may lead to very low 
educational standards and/or to government inflation of actual enrollment figures to include students who 
simply ought to be enrolled. 
t3This confirms the similar result in Richards and Waterbury (1990), P. 115. 
141n our net-discrepancy calculations, we took account direct as well as indirect effects. For example, 
besides its direct effect on income, the discrepancy in enrollments also affects income indirectly through 
the investment and population-growth equations. 
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TABLE 1 
"Explained" and "Non-explained" Variables 
Variable Symbol 
Explained Variables 
(1) Log per-capita income, 1985 LGDP85 
(2) Log avg. investment ratio, 1966-85 LINVR 
(3) Log avg. secondary school enrollment rate, 1966-85 LENR2 
(4) Avg. population growth / fertility rate, 1966-85 POPG I FERTIL 
Non-explained Variables 
(1) Price of investment goods, 1975 P1 
(2) Economy's degree of openness OPEN 
(3) Avg. proportion of households that is urban, 1966-85 URBAN 
(4) Relative cost of secondary school teachers, 1966 CTEA2 
(5) Avg. below-five child mortality, 1966-85 MORT5 
Lagged Variables 
(1) Initial log avg. investment ratio, 1960-66 LINVR6O66 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fertility / Population Growth Equation 
Eqn. (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Dep. Variable. FERTIL FERTIL POPG POPG 
No. of Obs. 94 94 94 94 
Constant 11.32 11.62 6.39 6.53 
(8.64) (8.86) (6.00) (6.09) 
LENR2 -0.381 -0.372 -0.143 -0.144 
(-1.91) (-1.85) (-0.97) (-0.93) 
MORT5 8.21 8.10 0.648 0.549 
(3.56) (3.48) (0.34) (0.28) 
LGDP66 -0.799 -0.842 -0.519 -0.537 
(-4.81) (-5.16) (-4.35) (-4.46) 
MENA 1.68 0.561 
(2.86) (1.95) 
SYR 3.16 1.53 
(28.98) (18.04) 
JOR 3.30 1.04 
(19.13) (8.44) 
EGY -0.09 -0.09 
(-0.35) (-0.54) 
TUN 1.05 0.17 
(8.45) (1.70) 
MAR 0.93 0.14 
(8.55) (1.74) 
R2 0.78 0.80 0.48 0.50 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 4 
Human Capital Equation 
Eqn. (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Variable. LENR2 LENR2 LENR2 LENR 1 L1T85 
No. of Obs. 94 94 65 65 68 
Constant -0.819 -0.967 -0.968 3.10 -57.8 
(-1.04) (-1.20) (-1.41) (5.74) (-2.58) 
URBAN 0.0146 0.0137 0.00928 0.00457 
(3.20) (2.97) (2.40) (1.82) 
CTEA2 -0.00509 -0.00354 
(-2.63) (-2.58) 
LGDP66 0.473 0.498 0.541 0.148 





SYR 0.427 0.307 0.101 -12.63 
(7.81) (4.93) (2.55) (-2.61) 
JOR 0.750 11.68 
(11.90) (3.45) 
EGY 1.043 0.959 0.067 -13.52 
(7.64) (7.24) (0.67) (-4.84) 
TUN -0.044 -0.145 0.233 -11.08 
(-0.72) (-2.02) (4.80) (-3.03) 
MAR 0.058 -0.065 -0.166 -25.55 
(0.83) (-0.75) (-2.85) (-8.96) 
R2 0.68 0.70 0.76 0.54 0.32 




(Dependent Variable: LINVR) 
Eqn. (20) (21) 
No. of Obs. 93 93 
Constant 2.21 2.19 
(14.83) (14.44) 
LENR2 0.229 0.232 
(5.42) (5.43) 
P1 -0.00478 -0.00472 
(-5.71) (-5.49) 














R2 0.70 0.70 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent 




(Dependent Variable: LGDP85) 
Eqn. (22) (23) 
No. of Obs. 94 94 
Constant 0.522 0.434 
(1.28) (1.04) 
LINVR 0.263 0.278 
(3.43) (3.51) 
LENR2 0.198 0.193 
(2.84) (2.66) 
POPG -0.0500 -0.0539 
(-1.24) (-1.05) 














R2 0.92 0.93 
Note: Heteroskedast ic-consistent 
t-statistics shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7 
Initial Income Equation 
(Dependent Variable: LGDP66) 
Eqn. (24) (25) 
No. of Ohs. 88 88 
Constant 5.50 5.52 
(25.02) (24.53) 
LINVR6O66 0.248 0.233 
(2.28) (2.04) 
















t-statistics shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 8 
MENA Regional Discrepancies 
and their Effect on 1985 Income 
Variable Discrepancy Effect on 1985 Income Net Discrepancy 
Population Growth 0.56 1 -0.028 
Enrollment 0.439 0.116 
Investment -0.165 -0.043 
Initial Income -0.377 -0.337 
Final Income 0.343 0.343 0.051 
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TABLE 9 
Test of the "Fast Catch Up" Hypothesis 
(Dependent Variable: LGDP85) 
Eqn. (26) 


















shown in parentheses. 
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